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ABSTRACT 
Current  and  planned measures  liberalizing  the  external 
capital accounts  of  France  and  Italy  call  into  question  the 
continued  viability  of  the  policy  of  periodic  exchange-rate 
realignment  followed  to  date  in  the  European  Monetary  System 
(EMS). This  paper is intended  as a first  step in studying  the real 
and monetary effects  of EMS-style  realignments in  a  setting  of 
free cross-border financial  flows.  The  first  set  of  results 
derived concerns  a situation  in which  there  are  no  fundamental 
factors  behind domestic  inflation.  Under a policy  regime  in  which 
domestic inflation  automatically  triggers  devaluation,  the economy 
can  undergo  self-fulfilling  depreciation-inflation  spirals, 
triggered  by speculative  attack  on the exchange  rate.  Such  spirals 
do not occur  when realignments  do not offset  past inflation  fully. 
The second  set of results  shows  how an exchange  rate collapse  can 
occur  after inflation  is set off by  expansionary fiscal  policy. 
Sometimes,  but not always,  the crisis  will be preceded  by a period 
of capital inflows and real  currency  appreciation.  In other  cases 
fiscal  expansion  may set off an immediate  crisis. 
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Economic  Research 
1050  Massachusetts  Avenue 
Cambridge,  MA 02138 
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Since  its  inauguration  in  March  1979,  the  exchange-rate 
mechanism  of the European  Monetary  System  (EMS)  has  functioned 
with the aid of frequent  currrency  realignments--to date,  more 
than  one per year on average.  In the eyes  of many  observers,  the 
strategy  of frequent  realignment  has allowed  the system  to survive 
in spite of the rather divergent  macroeconomic  policies  pursued  by 
I  the  "Big Three"  of the  EMS,  France,  Germany,  and  Italy.  An 
apparently  critical  element in minimizing the financial  disruption 
caused by realignments  has  been  the  control  over  cross-border 
financial  flows  maintained by  France  and  Italy.  The  large 
onshore-offshore  interest  differentials  that have  emerged  during 
currency  crises suggest  that  capital  controls  have  played  an 
important  role  in insulating  the  French  and  Italian  financial 
systems  from the full force of speculative  capital  movements. 
Current  and  planned  measures  liberalizing  the  external 
capital accounts  of  France  and  Italy  call  into  question  the 
continued  viability  of a  widely-understood  EMS policy of  periodic 
realignment.  Yet the speculative  response  of  capital  flows  to 
expected  parity  change  is  an  area  that  has  received  little 
attention  in the academic literature.2  The  relative  neglect  of 
the role  parity changes  play  in  balance-of-payments crises  is 
puzzling:  empirically,  devaluation  fears are  a  leading- -perhaps 
the leading- -factor behind currency  flight,  just  as  speculative 
inflows  are often inspired  by  hopes  of  revaluation.  A  further 
shortcoming  of the existing  literature  is that,  for the most part, 
it stops  short  of  analyzing  the  possible  real  macroeconomic 
effects of exchange-rate  crises. 
This paper is intended  as a first step in studying  the  real and monetary effects  of EMS-type  realignment  policies in a setting 
of free  cross-border  financial  flows.  A simple model that serves 
as the paper's  analytical  framework  is sketched in Section  1.  The 
precise question  then  asked is:  What  kinds  of  equilibria  can 
arise when markets  expect  a loss  of home  competitiveness  against 
foreign  goods  to lead to realignment?  Although  much work  remains 
to be done,  the results  of a preliminary  investigation are  quite 
suggestive. 
The first set of results, described  in Section  2, concerns  a 
situation  in which there  are  no  fundamental  factors  (such  as 
fiscal  expansion)  behind domestic inflation.  Instead,  Section  2 
analyzes the economy's  behavior  under  exchange-rate rules  that 
allow cumulative  inflation  to trigger  realignment automatically. 
The key  finding  is that such rules  can induce multiple  equilibria. 
Specifically,  if realignment  is expected  to maintain  or  enhance 
external  competitiveness,  the economy  has two  equilibria.  One  of 
these involves  an inflationary  spiral in which speculators  force a 
collapse  of the fixed  exchange  rate  and  a  depreciation  of  the 
currency to its new  peg.  When realignment  is expected to aim at a 
real appreciation  of the domestic  currency,  however, there is only 
one equilibrium:  the inflation-depreciation  spiral cannot  occur. 
These  results  suggest  that  under  conditions  of  capital 
mobility,  a systematic realignment  policy  may  have  disruptive 
effects--in  financial  markets,  in the output  and  labor  markets, 
and on domestic inflation.  Although  the  results  are model-specific 
and therefore  should  not be taken too literally,  they also provide 
a  rationale  for  the  recent  EMS  practice  of  only  partially 
offsetting  differential  inflation  through  currency  realignment.3 
A  second  set of results,  explained  in  Section  3,  studies expected  realignment  in a setting  where domestic  price  inflation 
is already  being driven  by fundamentals  (here, fiscal  expansion). 
The possible equilibria  of the economy  depend  on  how  fully  the 
authorities  attempt  to  offset  past  inflation  through  currency 
depreciation.  If devaluation  is large  relative  to past inflation, 
an exchange-rate  collapse  occurs  as soon as an expansionary  fiscal 
policy is enacted, but before any real  appreciation  has  occurred. 
In the face of smaller  devaluations,  the fixed exchange  rate  can 
coexist  with  domestic  inflation  for  some  time  before  the 
inevitable  collapse  occurs. 
1. The Mode]. 
A  simple model with sticky output  prices is the  setting  for 
the discussion;  in line with the  likely  evolution  of  financial 
arrangements  within the EMS, perfect capital  mobility is  assumed. 
Three basic hypotheses  are  (1) that the exchange  rate  is  pegged 
entirely through the interventton  of the home  central  bank,  (2) 
that  the home central  bank has only a limited  capacity  to  defend 
the exchange rate  (in a  sense to be made precise  below),  and  (3) 
that  the  fixed  exchange  rate  must  be  abandoned  (at  least 
temporarily)  once  this  capacity has  been  exhausted.  These 
hypotheses do not square perfectly  with the facts of the EMS,  but 
they lead to a useful  benchmark  model  on  which  more  realistic 
analyses can be built. 
The  analytical  framework  is  the  overshooting model  of 
Dornbusch (1976) and Mussa (1977),  as set out  in  the  survey  by 
Obstfeld and  Stocknian  (1985).  In  the  following  description, 
variables other than interest  rates are natural  logarithms,  and  a variable such as Dz(t)  is the  (right-hand)  time derivative  of  z at 
time  t.  Perfect  foresight  is assumed,  so no distinction  is  made 
between actual and expected  rates of change. 
With free capital  mobility and perfect  substitution  between 
domestic-  and  foreign-currency bonds,  the  onshore  domestic 
interest  rate,  i(t), is related  by interest  parity to the  (fixed) 
foreign  rate,  i*,  and  the  expected  rate  of  domestic  currency 
depreciation,  De(t): 
(1)  i(t) — i* + De(t). 
The exchange rate e(t)  is the price of foreign  currency  in  terms 
of domestic. 
If m(t)  is the home  money  supply,  y  the  (fixed)  level  of 
domestic  output,  and p(t)  the money price  of  output,  equilibrium 
in the money market  occurs when 
(2)  m(t)  - p(t)  —  -yy 
-  Ai(t). 
Let p* be  the  (fixed)  foreign-currency price  of  foreign 
output,  which is distinct from  domestic  output.  Aggregate  demand 
for domestic  output is 
(3)  d(t) — [p* + e(t) 
-  p(t)] 
- [i(t) -  Dp(t)]. 
Because the price of home output is sticky,  aggregate  demand  and 
supply can  differ in the short run. 
Imbalances  in  the  output  market  contribute  to  price 
adjustment,  however,  and  the model's final element is an  equation 
to describe  price dynamics.  Let (t) denote  the output price that 5 
would currently  clear the  goods market;  as in Mussa  (1977),  this 
price is defined  as the solution to 
(4)  y  — p* + e(t)  - (t)]  -  o'[i(t)  - Dp(t)J. 
Then the inflation  rate  is given  by 
(5)  Dp(t)  — 9[d(t) 
-  yl + Dp(t), 
where 9 measures the  sensitivity  of  inflation  to  excess  output 
demand.  The  second  term  in  equation  (5)  is  central  to  the 
discussion  below,  as it captures  the pure effects  of  inflationary 
expectations  on the price  level. 
Assume now (for notational  simplicity)  that  i*, y, and p* are 
zero.  Then for a constant  money stock,  in,  the stationary  values of 
the exchange rate and price level are e() — p(')  —  in,  and  the 
stationary  value  of  the real exchange rate, x(t) —  p*  +  e(t) 
p(t),  is therefore  x(v)  — 0.  Under a floating  exchange  rate,  the 
dynamics of convergence  to this long-run  equilibrium  are given  by 
the pair of differential  equations 
(6)  De(t)  —  [p(t) 
- 
(7)  Dp(t) — 9[e(t) 
-  e()J  + (  - 9)[p(t) 
- p()} 
(see Obstfeld and Stockman,  l985). 
Figures la and lb show the two possible configurations  of the 
system described  by the preceding  two equations.  In each case the 
model has the familiar  saddlepath  property:  for any initial  price 
level  p(O),  there is a unique  equilibrium exchange  rate  on  SS, 
e(O),  consistent  with  the  economy's  eventual  arrival  at  its zO  A 
(a)  p 
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long-run  position.  Also shown  in  the  diagrams  are  the  "anti9 
saddlepaths  AA, which play  an  important  role  in  the  analysis 
below. 
The  two roots of the system  are  1/A and -9; it can be  shown 
that a general  solution  takes the  form 
(8)  e(t)  - e(o)  — k1exp(t/)) 
- (l/A9)kexp(-8t), 
(9)  p(t)  - p() = kexp(t/X)  + kexp(-9t), 
where k  and k  are parameters  determined  by  initial  conditions 
Setting  k  — 0  gives  the equation  for SS: 
(10)  p(t) 
- p() — -A9[e(t)  - e()]. 
Setting  k2 —  0  gives  the equation  for AA: 
(11)  p(t) — e(t). 
The unstable  path AA thus  coincides  with  a  450  ray  from  the 
origin. 
2. Inflation  and Realignment:  Self-fulfilling  Equilibria 
To focus on the pure effects  of  an  anticipated  realignment 
policy, the model abstracts  in this  section from all  disturbances 
that  might  alter  the  long-run  equilibrium  level  of  external 
competitiveness.  The model thus concentrates  on  monetary  factors 
alone,  and asks  if  even  under  these  relatively  uflcomplicated 
conditions,  expected realignments  can have disruptive  effects  on 
the macroeconomy.  In particular,  can expected  realignments  lead 7 
to equilibria  that look like inflation-devaluation  spirals? 
The answer depends  on the  mechanism  in  place  to  fix  the 
exchange  rate.  Here I assume that  the policy authority  allows the 
exchange  rate to float once private  capital  outflows have  reduced 
the  domestic money stock to a positive  lower  bound of 
m0.  Such  a 
situation  would arise,  for example,  if the central  bank's external 
credit  lines provided insufficient  foreign  exchange  to  purchase 
outstanding  domestic credit and if other tools  for  reducing  the 
domestic  component  of the monetary  base were unavailable. 
The realignment  rule  followed by the  policy  authority  must 
now  be specified.  Imagine  that the  exchange  rate  is  initially 
fixed at the level  and that  the  corresponding  long-run  price 
level is p.  <To these prices  there  corresponds  an  endogenously 
determined  money stock  in —  p  +  7y  -  Ai*  — .)  The  policy 
authority's  rule is to devalue  the currency to an exchange  rate of 
e' >  if the price level reaches  the trigger  value of  > p. 
Suppose  first  that  e'  ￿ .  The  interpretation  of  this 
condition  is  that  when  p  reaches  the  trigger  point,  the 
authorities  devalue the currency  to a level  that  <at  a  minimum) 
restores  current  external  competitiveness  to its  long-run value. 
Clearly,  one equilibrium  of the model is the one in which  nothing 
happens and the economy  remains  at the initial  equilibrium,  e — 
p — .  With no shocks disturbing  markets, there is no reason  for 
p ever to reach its trigger  level and bring the realignment  policy 
into play. 
There is,  however,  a  second  equilibrium,  illustrated  in 
Figure 2.  <The  analysis  henceforth  assumes,  without  loss  of 
generality,  that the  configuration  of Figure la  is  the  relevant 







currency as soon as the realignment  rule becomes  known.  Private 
capital  outflows reduce  the money  supply  to  m  and  force  the 
central  bank to withdraw from the  foreign  exchange  market:  the 
economy  is know on an unstable  path of  the  floating-rate  system 
associated  with a  money supply  equal to the minimal level m.  The 
collapse  results in a sharp currency  depreciation  [to e(O)],  after 
which e and  p rise together  in an  inflation-depreciation spiral. 
When p reaches ,  e  — '  and the central  bank can peg the exchange 
rate at this new level if no  further  realignment  is  expected.5 
Subsequently,  rising domestic  prices erode any short-term  gain  in 
competitiveness  as p rises to its new  long-run  level, p' — 
This  second equilibrium  is driven  entirely  by self-fulfilling 
expectations  that there  will be a crisis  followed  by inflation  and 
a realignment.6  Since a  speculative  attack causes  a  depreciation 
of the domestic currency,  each speculator  has an incentive  to join 
in if he believes an attack  is about  to occur.  The immediate  real 
currency  depreciation  helps pull  domestic  prices  up  until  the 
trigger  price level  is reached.  In this alternative  equilibrium, 
the exchange rate reaches its new peg just as  the  trigger  price 
level  is reached,  so there  is no need for a  discrete  anticipated 
jump in the  exchange  rate,  which  would  be  inconsistent  with 
asset-market  equilibrium  (Krugman  1979).  Although  the 
exchange-rate  collapse  causes an immediate  real  depreciation,  the 
currency  subsequently  appreciates  in  real  terms  during  the 
transitional  float that  precedes the  return  to  realigned  fixed 
rates. 
Perhaps surprisingly,  there  is  only  one  equilibrium- -the 
first of the  two described  above-  -when ' < ,  so  that  the  policy 
authority  realigns  without attempting  to offset  fully  the  price 9 
inflation  that  has occurred in the past.  To  see  this,  consider 
Figure 3.  In the case shown there,  the only  exchange-rate paths 
avoiding a  discrete  jump at the moment of realignment  call  for  an 
appreciation  of the currency  just after the attack that drives  the 
central  bank  from  the  exchange  market.  This  immediate 
appreciation  means  that the  hypothesized  speculative  attack  in 
fact  never  occurs:  no  individual  speculator would  find  it 
profitable to participate.  The economy  thus remains at e — e,  p — 
if it is believed that the realignment policy  will  not  fully 
offset past inflation. 
To understand  the difference  between the present case  and the 
last one, observe that the post-attack  change in the exchange  rate 
is influenced  by two factors,  the initial  drop in the money supply 
(from  to 
m0) 
the expectation  that  the  exchange  rate  will  be 
pegged at the level ' in the  future.  The first factor pushes the 
price of foreign  currency  downward  after the  attack,  the  second 
pushes it upward upward.7  The second factor  dominates  when  the 
realigned  exchange  rate is more competitive  because it is only  by 
depreciating  initially  that the real  exchange  rate can  be  higher 
also when the central  bank re-enters  the foreign  exchange  market. 
The case  —  is a  borderline  case  in which both equilibria 
are possible.  In this case,  the  authorities  peg  at  a  nominal 
exchange  rate  that  maintains  the  original  level  of 
competitiveness,  given that  p  is  at  the  trigger  point.  The 
initial speculative attack  leaves the floating  exchange  rate  at 
its pre-attack level  ,  after which e and  p rise  together  along  AA 
until p reaches  p.  At this point the currency  is again  pegged and 



















3.  Attacks that  Are Justified by Fundamentals 
The previous  section  established  the  existence  of  multiple 
equilibria  under an accommodative  realignment  rule.  Central  to 
the  discussion  was  the  precise  form  of  the  authorities' 
exchange-rate  rule: under alternative  rules  the  multiplicity  can 
disappear.  If the policy  rule  is to realign  only after  the  real 
exchange rate has appreciated  by a given amount,  for example,  the 
inflationary  paths of the previous  section  are no longer supported 
by the policy rule, because the attack  that  sets off the inflation 
leads  to a temporary  gain in competitiveness,  not  a loss. 
This  section  demonstrates  how  speculative  attacks  can 
nonetheless occur  when realignment  is prompted  by  a  current  or 
prospective  loss  in external  competitiveness  due  to  fundamental 
factors.  (In contrast,  the inflations  prompting  the  realignments 
described  in the previous section  were entirely the result of  the 
prospect of accommodation.)  Once  again,  the behavior of the model 
turns  on the degree  to which the  authorities  attempt  to  offset 
inflation  through  devaluation. 
Under the posited  conditions  of a  fixed  exchange  rate  and 
interest  parity,  continuing  domestic-credit expansion  by  the 
authorities  would lead to steady foreign  reserve  loss  rather  than 
to real  currency  appreciation.  I therefore  assume that the  source 
of real  appreciation  is,  instead,  fiscal.  With a  fixed  exchange 
rate and a sticky price level,  fiscal  expansion  induces  temporary 
excess output demand and  thus  a  gradual  price-level  rise  that 
appreciates  the currency in real  terms  and  eventually  restores 
output-market  equilibrium.  The specific  scenario analyzed  is  one 
in which fiscal expansion  sets off  domestic  inflation,  but  the 
market expects the policy authority  to devalue  some  time  before i-i 
the  full upward adjustment  of the home price level  is complete. 
The model used in the previous  sections can  be  extended  to 
allow for aggregate-demand  shocks such  as  fiscal-policy  shifts. 
Write the aggregate-demand  equation  (3)  as 
d(t) — [p* + e(t) 
-  p(t)] 
-  o'j:i(t) 
-  Dp(t)J  + g, 
where g is  a  demand-shift  factor.  The  steady  state  of  the 
floating-rate  model becomes p() —  m,  e() — m  -  g/, x()  e() 
- p() — -g/,  for any constant  money supply m.  (Recall that p — 
0.)  The equation  of the unstable  linear  path AA is now p(t)  e(t) 
+ g/:  a rise in g causes a  parallel  leftward  shift  of  AA  in 
Figures  Ia and lb. 
Figure 4 shows  one example  of how  the economy  can react to  a 
fiscal stimulus  followed  by realignment.  Initially  g — 0  and  the 
long-run  values of the price level and exchange  rate  are shown  as 
p and e; a rise  in g sets  prices  moving  upward.  (The  nominal 
money supply  must also rise over time, as  a  result  of  official 
intervention,  to maintain  equilibrium  in the  money  market.)  So 
long as the exchange rate remains  fixed at ,  the  economy  moves 
vertically toward point E,  the new long-run  position  that  would 
eventually  be reached In the absence  of an  exchange-rate change. 
Point E lies on A'A'  ,  the  "anti"  saddlepath associated with  a 
permanent level g  of the demand-shift  parameter. 
Assume now  that the market  expects  the  authorities  to realign 
the exchange  rate at  once  the price  level  reaches .  In  this 
case  an attack occurs  at point F,  so that the economy is placed on 
a path of the floating-rate  system  associated with  the  minimal 

















the unique one with the property  that  a  reaches  '  just  as  p 
reaches  .  No  discrete  jump in a takes place  at  the  moment  of 
re-pegging (though there is a sharp  capital  inflow  that raises  m), 
and the economy converges  afterward  to point C as inflation  falls 
to zero.  Clearly  the devaluation  has no long-run effect  on  the 
real exchange rate, but it does  cause  a  higher  long-run  price 
level. 
Two features  of the path  just  described  deserve  emphasis. 
First,  even though  the  eventual  attack  is  perfectly  foreseen, 
there  is an initial period following  the  fiscal  impulse  during 
which prices rise,  the capital  account  is  In  surplus,  and  the 
exchange  rate  remains  fixed.  The pattern  of capital  inflows  and 
real  currency  appreciation followed  by  external  crisis  is 
reminiscent  of events  that  accompanied  the  stabilization plans 
undertaken  in Latin  America's  Southern  Cone  in  the  late  l970s. 
Second,  competitiveness  continues  to  deteriorate  during  the 
transitional  period of floating  (since  p is rising faster  than  e 
below A'A'  ,  which  itself  has  a  45°  slope).  Thus,  realignment 
occurs  after  a  steady  deterioration in  competitiveness,  in 
contrast  to the example  of the  last  section.  There,  the  real 
exchange  rate first depreciated  (as a result  of  collapse),  then 
appreciated  as realignr3nt  approached. 
As Figure  5  shows,  however,  other  adjustment paths  are 
possible.  In Figure  5,  the authorities'  realignment  policy  calls 
for a devaluation  so large that  competitiveness  is  (temporarily) 
restored  to its original,  pre-fiscal-expansion,  level.  In  this 
case  the fiscal expansion  sparks  an  immediate  collapse  and  a 
nominal currency  depreciation  to  point  F.  The  associated  real 








transitional  float  that brings the economy  to e  e' 
,  p  p. After 
re-pegging,  there  is  a  further  loss  in  competitiveness  as 
inflation  brings the economy  to point G.  Once again,  there is  no 
ultimate gain in competitiveness  as a result  of the  exchange-rate 
change. 
The lesson of this example  is  that  the  expectation  of  an 
over-energetic attempt  to  restore  competitiveness despite  a 
structural  shift  in  the  real  exchange  rate  can  set  off  an 
immediate  run on the currency.  Such  runs  occur  even  before  any 
real appreciation  emerges,  and  thus  may  appear  to  be  without 
foundation  in market  fundamentals.  Nonetheless,  they  are  the 
result  of rational anticipations  of future exchange-rate  policy. 
The fiscal policy shock  analyzed  here is  not  the  only  one 
calling for a  change in the long-run  real exchange  rate.  A very 
plausible  situation  involves expected  devaluation  after an adverse 
shift  in the demand for domestic exports.  (Such  a  devaluation 
could have the  advantage, n  principle,  of shortening  the  period 
of recession  that results  from the shock.) A puzzling  result  is 
easy to verify using the techniques  employed  above:  In many cases 
an equilibrium  does not exist. 
Obviously,  much of the analysis  above rests  heavily  on  the 
assumption  of  continu,us-time  trading.  A discrete-time model 
would allow devaluations  that were not  preceded  by  transitional 
floats,  although  paths similar  to those  analyzed  above would still 
be possible.  Arguably,  the continuous-time  trading  assumption  is 
reasonably  close to reality. 14 
4.  Implications  and Extensions 
The model examined  above is simple, but its  implications  are 
stark. A  policy of attempting  to  accommodate  domestic  inflation 
through  real  devaluation  can  lead  to  multiple 
rational-expectations  equilibria.  One  of  these  involves  an 
exchange  crisis  and  a  subsequent spiral  of  inflation  and 
depreciation  that ultimately  leave  the economy  with a  permanently 
higher price level  and exchange  rate.  In contrast,  a  policy  of 
partial  accommodation--if credible--precludes the  inflationary 
equilibrium.  As noted in the  introduction,  this  reasoning  may 
provide one rationale  for  the failure  of EMS  realignments  to fully 
accommodate  differential  inflation  in recent years.9 
Exchange-rate crises  can  also  arise  in  response  to 
realignments  that attempt  to offset inflation  due to  expansionary 
fiscal  policy.  Inflation  and real appreciation  may  continue  for 
some time  before  a  collapse  occurs,  even  though  an  eventual 
collapse is anticipated by  the  market.  A  sufficiently  large 
anticipated  devaluation  may,  however,  cause  an  immediate  attack 
that itself postpones  the  inevitable  real appreciation. 
The  model  used  above  clearly  leaves  many  unanswered 
questions.  For example,  is a single-country  analysis  applicable  to 
situations in which several  EMS  members  may  be  intervening  to 
defend a  parity?10 A related  question  concerns  the equilibria  that 
arise when the authorities'  ability  to  defend  a  rate  is  not 
limited in the manner assumed  above,  so that the  authorities  can 
and do purchase the entire  money supply  to  defend  the  exchange 
rate.  This possibility  would appear  to  rule  out  the  multiple 
equilibria  of Section  2, but not obviously  to preclude the attacks 
of Section  3, since  the public could reduce  its money holdings  to 15 
zero just  before devaluation. 
At a deeper level, one must ask whether there  are  plausible 
policymaker  preferences  that  might  generate  the  types  of 
realignment  rules  examined  in this paper.  All of these  questions 
raise difficult  problems  for  economic  analysis,  but  they  are 
central  to understanding  the present and  prospective  functioning 
of the EMS, Appendix:  Algebraic  Analysis  of Self-fulfilling  Equilibria 
An  algebraic  analysis  of  the  inflationary  equilibrium 
discussed  in Section  2 clarifies  some aspects  of  self-fulfilling 
paths.  Such an analysis  can be based on equations  (8)  and  (9), 
the general  solutions  for  the  dynamic  system  describing  the 
floating-rate  model. 
To construct  an inflationary  equilibrium,  one  must  find  a 
transition  time T and constants  k  and k  such that e(T) — e'  and 
1  2 
p(T) —  when e(t)  and p(t)  follow  the equations 
e(t) 
-  m  — kexp(t/A) 
-  (l/AO)kexp(-9t), 
p(t) 
-  m  — kexp(t/))  + k2exp(-Ot), 
that is,  when the post-attack  floating  rate  is  determined  in  a 
system with money supply  m.  One initial condition  is  given  by 
the  stickiness  of  prices:  p(O)  — ,  So  there  are  three 
conditions--one  initial,  two terminal--to  determine  the  unknown 
parameters  T, k  and k 
1  2 
The solution  for T  is  given  implicitly by  the  nonlinear 
equation 
(12)  A(T) — 
where 
(  -  in  )  -  (p 
-  m)exp(-OT) 
(e'  - m)  + (l/AO)(p 
- 
m0)exp(-9T) 
exp(T/A)  - exp(-9T) 
(T) — 
exp(T/A) + (l/A8)exp(-9T) 17 
Figure  6 illustrates  how T is determined  by (12).  Note that as  T 
- ,  A(T)  - (  -  m)/(' 
-  m)  while  B(T)  -  I,  Thus,  for 
realignment  rules  such that 
'  ￿  at  least one  intersection  of 
A(T)  and B(T)  is guaranteed.  Intersections  are also  possible  for 
some nonacconunodative realignment  rules,  of course, but  these  do 
not  define  equilibria because  the  currency  would  have  to 
appreciate  immediately  after the speculative  attack that sets  off 
the  inflation. 
One case that  is easy to analyze  explicitly  is the borderline 
case referred  to in the  text, in which '  .  In this  case  the 
solution to (12) is 




is  )]. 
Direct calculation  shows that the appropriate  initial  conditions 
are k  —  -  ni  and 
k2 
—  0,  which  imply  that  the  equilibrium 
floating  exchange  rate immediately  after the attack  is 
e(O) — 
the original peg.  After the attack,  the exchange  rate  therefore 
moves toward  its new peg  along the  path  AA  in  Figure  2.  The 
adjustment  process is in this  case a  pure inflation  that does  not 
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1.  Among recent  reviews  of  the EMS experience are Collins (1987), 
Giavazzi  and Ciovannini (1986), Rogoff (1985), and Ungerer et  al. 
(1986). 
2.  Exceptions  include  Blanco  and Garber  (1986),  Feenstra  (1985), 
Gros  (1987), and  Obstfeld (1984).  As will  become apparent  below, 
some of Feenstra's  conclusions,  although  reached  in  a  financial 
setting  more descriptive  of  some  developing  economies  than  of 
Europe,  are quite  relevant  for analyzing  prospective  developments 
in the EMS. 
3.  See,  for example,  Giavazzi and Pagano  (1988). 
4.  Equations (6)  and (7)  follow from (1),  (2), and the fact  that 
under  price-adjustment rule  (5),  the  real  exchange  rate  is 
driven  to its long-run  value of zero  according  to  the  equation 
Dx(t)  -Ox(t). 
5.  A similar  response  to anticipated  devaluation  is  analyzed  by 
(1QS',  4r,  f  vihl  nr,' mndel  of  currency  substitution based on utility  maximization.  Notice that, in  contrast  to  the 
case discussed  in Obstfeld (1984), the length of the  transitional 
period of floating is endogenous  here.  This  is also true  of  the 
transitional  float analyzed in the next section. 
6.  The alternative  equilibrium  provides another  example  of  the 
type of self-fulfilling  crisis  studied  in my 1986 paper.  The  role 
of  self-fulfilling accommodative policies  is  studied  in  a 
different  context  by Corden (1986). 
7.  See,  for example,  Flood and  Garber  (1983)  or  Obstfeld  and 
Stockman (1985). 
8.  An algebraic  analysis  is given in the Appendix. 
9.  A  natural  question  is  whether  capital  controls  preclude 
multiple  equilibria  by  preventing,  or  at  least  minimizing, 
speculative  reserve  outflows.  Models  of  anticipatory wage  and 
price setting,  such as Calvo (1983), suggest  a tentative  negative 
answer.  The question  deserves  a thorough  analysis,  however. 
10.  For a clear  account  of EMS intervention  arrangements,  see the 
paper by Mastropasqua,  Micossi,  and Rinaldi in this volume. References 
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